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Re-Evaluating the Revenue Law Rule and the Non-Enforcement of Foreign Tax Claims 
Dr Bobby W.M Lindsay 
 
I: Introduction 
 
Rule 3(1) of Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws boldly proclaims that:1  
 
English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action… for the enforcement, either directly 
or indirectly, of a… [revenue law]…  of a foreign state. 
 
This “revenue law rule” – which precludes the enforcement in State A of claims which arise under 
the revenue law of a foreign state – was recently applied, without question, by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council in Webb v Webb,2 wherein it was described as a “long-standing principle of the 
common law”.3  
 
This paper, however, argues against the unthinking continued application of the rule. It conducts a 
re-examination which, it shall be argued, demonstrates that the rule is bereft of a justified policy basis 
and is beset with doctrinal complications and contradictions. This suggests that the rule’s abrogation 
is overdue. This analysis forms part of a wider project, which analyses the ‘exclusionary rules’ of 
private international law. Alongside foreign revenue laws, these prohibit the enforcement of foreign 
penal laws and ‘other public laws’, but, on a long-overdue focussed critical examination of those 
rules, there is little to be said for their justification. These insights have implications beyond private 
international law; they raise questions and may have consequences for the enforcement of domestic 
tax law,4 public international law, the practice of foreign relations, and the regulation of international 
trade. As the ‘revenue law rule’ is the most developed of the three ‘exclusionary rules’, it is an 
appropriate starting point for such an examination. 
 
The paper begins by tracing the development of the revenue law rule, observing that initially it was 
grounded in a chauvinistic and insular predilection to further British trading interests at all costs, with 
no desire evinced for international cooperation. Despite the anachronism of those notions, the rule 
has received constant reaffirmation. Next, the definitional problem of what amounts to a “revenue” 
law is confronted. It will be demonstrated that there is no conceptual clarity on the subject-matter 
--------------------------------  
1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury (ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 
(“Dicey (15th: 2012)”), [5-019]. 
2 [2020] JCPC 22 (Cook Islands). 
3 ibid, [32]. 
4 See e.g. R (Jimenez) v First Tier Tribunal [2019] 1 WLR 2956. 
 
3 
scope of the rule, i.e. on what characterises a law as a ‘revenue’ one. It will be suggested that the 
indicia of a revenue law are that it: imposes liability on persons falling, by reason of status or conduct, 
within its scope; makes payment of that liability compulsory; and is imposed for the purpose of 
collecting funds to finance the apparatus of the state, rather than as reimbursement for benefits 
conferred on a specified class of beneficiaries.  
 
The paper then tackles the application of the enforcement/recognition distinction in the revenue 
context. The concept of enforcement has been defined broadly, to encompass claims of “indirect 
enforcement”. This has been held to include claims which have been formulated in private law but 
nevertheless have the effect, through compensation or restitution, of making up for unpaid tax. This 
extension will be criticised, and it will be shown that the expansive common law approach is 
inconsistent with the approach adopted under EU private international law. Therefore, it will be 
submitted that, if the revenue law rule has any claim to operate at all, it should be restricted to cases 
of direct enforcement, i.e. where a foreign government purely founds its claim on provisions of its 
tax law. However, even in this heavily circumscribed form, it will be argued that the fact that the rule 
is inapplicable if the debtor is placed into insolvency proceedings robs it of much of its practical 
operation and removes the force of any supposed justification. From this, the paper concludes that 
there is little merit in the rule’s retention. 
 
II: The Historical Development of the Revenue Law Rule 
 
(a) Origins and the “Smuggling” Cases 
 
The revenue law rule is “an ancient dogma, still of unbelievable vigor….”5 Although axiomatic, its 
history is “not easy to ascertain”.6 In 1834, Story could state that the rule had “long been laid down” 
and was even then “firmly established in the actual practice of modern nations”.7   
 
--------------------------------  
5 AT Trautman and DT Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems (Little Brown and Co, 1965), 209. 
6 Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491, 504 (Viscount Simonds). For a general history of the rule, see DA 
Machum, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws’, LL.M Paper, Harvard University (1954), 4-10; JG Castel, 
‘Foreign Tax Claims and Judgments in Canadian Courts’, (1964) 42 Canadian Bar Review 277, 283-291; H Cohen, 
‘Nonenforcement of Foreign Tax Laws and the Act of State Doctrine: A Conflict in Judicial Foreign Policy’, 11 Harvard 
Journal of International Law 1, 4-13l BA Silver, ‘Modernising the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreign Tax 
Judgments’, 22 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1992) 609, 613-619; WS Dodge, ‘Breaking the 
Public Law Taboo’, 43 Harvard International Law Journal (2002) 161, 170-172; B Mallinak, ‘The Revenue Rule: A 
Common Law Doctrine for the Twentieth Century’, 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (2006) 79, 
80-83. 
7 J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray & Co, 1834), §257. In the second edition (J Story, 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, Hilliard, Gray & Co, 1841)), the same section read that the revenue law 
rule was now “too firm, perhaps, to be shaken except by some Legislative Act abolishing it”. 
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Despite the rule’s baldness, its history is not one of the unequivocal refusal to give effect to foreign 
revenue laws. Furthermore, the early authorities do not display any principled basis for the rule’s 
existence. They date from an era where comity was at a low ebb and the parochial solipsism of nation 
states discriminated against foreign trade through taxation. Alongside well-documented animosity 
between Britain and France at the turn of the 19th Century, there existed contemporaneous total 
prohibitions of British imports by Spain8 and Prussia.9 Self-serving dedication to the sustenance of 
British trade, however justifiable at the time, renders these cases frail authority upon which to found 
a rule appropriate for modern conditions. 
 
The identity of the progenitor of the rule is unclear. Lord Mansfield often receives credit.10 However, 
as shall be seen, his dictum in Holman v Johnson11 does not live up to its foundational status, and is 
not even the earliest reference to the revenue law rule. Some judges nominate Lord Hardwicke’s 
judgment in Boucher v Lawson,12 but an earlier reference can be found in Attorney General v 
Lutwydge.13   
 
In Lutwydge, the defendants imported tobacco into Scotland and gave a bond at Dumfries for 
outstanding duties. The Attorney General sought payment in the English Court of Exchequer, but 
Lutwydge contended that the sole court competent was its Scottish equivalent. The Lord Chief Baron 
referred the question to the full Exchequer Chamber, but no record exists of their consideration of 
the issue. Of present interest14 is the judge’s unequivocal statement that “[b]efore the [1707 Union] 
this court had no jurisdiction of the revenues in Scotland”.15   
 
This resembles the traditional formulation of the exclusionary rules in terms of a jurisdictional 
limitation.16 Nevertheless, Lutwydge is of limited assistance: Lord Pengelly’s dictum is mere 
assertion, and it is unclear in which sense – personal, subject matter, or by dint of rules of procedure 
– the English court lacked jurisdiction. 
 
--------------------------------  
8 Matthie v Potts (1802) 3 Bos & P 23, 127 ER 14.  
9 Simeon v Bazett (1813) 2 M&S 94, 105 ER 31.  
10 See Cheshire (15th: 2017) 116; Her Majesty the Queen v Gilbertson 597 F 2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) 1164; Stewart v 
Gelot (1871) 9 M 1057 1064. 
11 (1775) 1 Cowper 341, 98 ER 1120. 
12 (1734) Cunn 144, 94 ER 1116. See James v Catherwood (1822) 3 Dow & Ry 190; Re Visser [1928] Ch 877 882. 
13 Attorney General v Lutwydge (1729) Bunbury 281, 145 ER 674. 
14 Intra-UK enforcement raises distinct issues. 
15 Lutwydge (n 13) 282/674. 
16 Cf Lord Mansfield’s axiom, discussed below, which speaks of ‘no notice’ being taken of such laws.  
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Boucher v Lawson17 is even less instructive. The plaintiff sought delivery of a cargo of Portuguese 
gold. To resist this, the defendant relied on a Portuguese prohibition on the export of gold. That 
defence failed, with Lord Hardwicke CJ opining that denial of a remedy to the plaintiff would “cut 
off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom” which would be detrimental to “the principal and 
most beneficial branches of our trade”.18 Not only was this commercial activity lawful under English 
law, but it was also to be “very much encouraged”.19 The Portuguese law was ignored simply to avoid 
the ossification of English trade; the term ‘revenue’ appears nowhere in the judgment. 
 
Protectionism similarly colours Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Holman v Johnson.20 Johnson bought 
tea at Dunkirk from Holman, a Frenchman, who was aware of Johnson’s intention to smuggle the tea 
into England. Johnson failed to pay, and argued that Holman’s awareness of his scheme barred 
recovery of the contract price. In rejecting this argument, Lord Mansfield proclaimed that “no country 
ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another”.21  However, the only revenue law involved was 
English, and it is surely true that a country takes notice of its own revenue laws. The only way to 
make sense of Lord Mansfield’s dictum lies in the fact that, being made at Dunkirk, the contract was 
governed by French law. At best, this renders His Lordship’s statement redundant: not only would 
French law take no notice of the revenue laws of England, it would take no notice of any provision 
of English law. It was solely the French law of contract which fell to be applied. Moreover, evidence 
of French law was not led, so Lord Mansfield’s claim is either speculation, or assimilation with 
English law in the absence of such proof. 
 
Four years later, Lord Mansfield decided Planché v Fletcher.22 To circumvent excessive duties 
imposed by English and French authorities, papers would be doctored to make it appear to the English 
authorities that goods being exported were destined for a European port outside France, which then 
would be fabricated as the port of origin to dupe the French authorities. In Planché, underwriters 
alleged that this conduct amounted to fraud. Lord Mansfield disagreed, as “what has been practised 
in this case was proved to be the constant course of the trade, and notoriously so to everybody”.23 
The underwriters were aware surely of the practice, and thus no fraud had been visited upon them. 
There was no plea that the contract contravened English or French revenue laws, and it is unclear 
why Lord Mansfield repeated his “no notice” proclamation.24 
--------------------------------  
17 (1734) Cunn 144, 94 ER 1116. 
18 ibid, 148/1118. 
19 Remarks reported in (1735) Cas T Har 194 198. 
20 (1775) 1 Cowper 341, 98 ER 1120. 
21 ibid 343/1121. 
22 (1779) 1 Douglas 251, 99 ER 164. 
23 ibid, 253/165. 
24 ibid.  
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 The driving force behind these decisions was the preservation of English trade. Lord Mansfield did 
not let the tax laws of England, never mind those of another state, pose an obstacle. This is implied 
by his observation in Planché that it may have been in the interests of the French authorities to turn 
a blind eye to the scheme, since insisting on the imposition of the prohibitory tax on English goods 
could stultify trade. Clearly the ‘no notice’ proclamation was motivated by “a very questionable 
subserviency to mere commercial gains.”25  
 
It is submitted that too much weight has been placed on Lord Mansfield’s “extravagant dictum”.26 
Neither case involved the enforcement of a foreign revenue claim. They do not, therefore, offer any 
foundation for a wider principle compelling the absolute refusal of such claims. Moreover, 
subsequent cases construe the ‘no notice’ concept not as a restriction on jurisdiction, but as a rule 
depending on the nationality of the parties involved. 
 
For example, in Biggs v Lawrence,27 Lord Kenyon CJ noted that Holman concerned “foreigners, 
bound by no allegiance to this country”.28 Buller J was more explicit, distinguishing it on the basis 
that it “went on the ground of plaintiffs being foreigners”.29 as “the subjects of one country residing 
there are not bound to take notice of the revenue laws of any other”.30 Biggs, however, involved “one 
of the King’s subjects making a contract directly against the statute laws of this country”.31 This 
‘allegiance’ interpretation subsequently was adopted in lace smuggling cases, it being held that the 
assistance proffered by the foreign subjects was substantial enough to bar their action.32 This, 
however, was formulated as an exception to the rule of non-allegiance. As stated by Lord Abinger 
CB in Pellecatt v Angell:33 
 
...the subject of a foreign country is not bound to pay allegiance or respect to the revenue laws 
of this country; except… where he comes within the act of breaking them himself, he cannot 
recover here the fruits of that illegal act. 
 
--------------------------------  
25 Story (1841) (n 7), §245. 
26 AR Albrecht, ‘The Enforcement of Taxation Under International Law’, (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International 
Law 454, 461. 
27 (1789) 3 TR 454, 100 ER 673. 
28 ibid 456/675. 
29 ibid 457/675.  
30 ibid. 
31 See too Clugas v Penaluna (1791) 4 TR 466, 100 ER 1122, distinguishing Holman on this same basis. 
32 Bernard v Reed (1794) 1 Esp 92, 170 ER 290; Waymell v Reed (1794) TR 599, 101 ER 335; Rotche v Edie (1795) 6 
TR 413, 101 ER 623. 
33 (1835) 2 CM&R 312, 150 ER 135. 
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It is seldom appreciated that Holman initially was perceived to hinge on the filiation of the parties.34 
Nationals of State A must respect the revenue laws of State A, but they need not respect the revenue 
laws of State B, or any other state of which they are not a national. This may not have been limited 
to nationality, but may also include the flag of a ship. In Christie v Secreton,35 Lord Kenyon indicated 
that, if a sentence was passed by a French court on an American ship for breach of a navigational 
treaty between France and the United States then, because the ship owed obedience to US law, the 
English court “should not have been able to extricate [itself] from the effect of such a sentence”.36 
This suggests no inherent repugnancy in recognising a foreign revenue judgment. 
 
Even at this time, doubts were entertained as to the policy merits of the revenue law rule. In 1818, 
Story J opined that:37  
 
It has appeared to me more consonant with national comity, sound morals, and public justice, 
that courts of all countries should lend their aid to discountenance frauds upon the revenue laws 
of other countries, and decline to enforce any agreements entered into for the purpose of 
evading those laws. 
 
Similar doubts were expressed as to the width of the rule by Lord Denman CJ in Spence v Chodwick,38 
who also opined that:39  
 
If, indeed, the contract appeared to have been made for the purpose of defrauding the Revenue 
laws of a foreign country, a question might arise as to whether we give effect to it. 
 
(b) Exceptions to ‘no notice’: The Stamp Duty Cases 
 
Indeed, there is a stream of cases which holds it is permissible to give effect to a foreign revenue law 
if non-compliance with that law under the applicable law of a contract rendered the contract 
unenforceable. For instance, in Alves v Hodgson,40 the defendant employed the plaintiff on a voyage 
from Jamaica to London, with payment to be made by a promissory note drawn in Jamaica. The 
--------------------------------  
34 Although, contrary to the normal common law preference for domicile, the connecting factor employed is that of 
nationality. This may emphasise the political origins of the revenue law rule. 
35 (1799) 8 TR 191, 101 ER 1340. 
36 ibid 196/1342. Lawrence J considered navigational laws as analogous to revenue laws: 197/1343. See too Sharp v 
Taylor (1849) 2 Ph 801, 41 ER 1153: contravention of US navigation laws did not bar recovery between two English 
subjects. 
37 The Anne 1 F Cas 955 (CCD Mass 1818) 956.  
38 (1847) 10 QB 517, 116 ER 197. 
39 Ibid, 527/201. 
40 (1797) 7 TR 241, 101 ER 953. 
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defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim for payment on the basis of non-payment of Jamaican stamp 
duty. Lord Kenyon CJ, in accepting that argument, noted that resort must be had “to the laws of the 
country in which the note was made: and unless it be good there, it is not obligatory in a Court of 
Law here”.41 Substantive effect, therefore, was given to the Jamaican tax law.  
 
Following this, Lord Ellenborough held in Clegg v Levy42 that, if the lex loci contractus mandated a 
stamp, a lack thereof would prevent the agreement being received into evidence in England. In 
contrast, in James v Catherwood,43 Lord Abbot CJ referred to the “prodigious inconvenience” which 
would flow from an English court having to require evidence of foreign tax law. This clearly is 
overbroad, for the same inconvenience is encountered whenever one must refer to any provision of 
a foreign law to determine the validity of a contract.44  
 
These cases fail to articulate a distinction between whether the absence of a stamp affects the validity 
of the contract, or whether it simply means the document cannot be accepted as evidence. The 
admissibility of evidence cannot be dictated by the lex loci contractus: this is a procedural matter 
exclusively within the preserve of the law of the forum. This distinction was teased out in Bristow v 
Sequeville,45 where it was applied by Rolfe B.46 Nevertheless, applying the foreign revenue law as 
part of the lex loci contractus still amounts to its enforcement. 
 
The Scottish courts took a more robust line.47 Stewart v Gelot48 concerned an unstamped bill of 
exchange drawn in Paraguay, where a stamp was mandatory. Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff first 
considered that Scots law was applicable.49 His Lordship opined that any violation of Paraguayan 
revenue law would be irrelevant. He was “not aware” of a Scottish court ever giving effect to foreign 
revenue law, noting that “[t]he authorities to the contrary are uniform”.50 The distinction drawn in 
Bristow v Sequeville51 was adverted to, with the Lord Justice Clerk describing it as based on “rather 
hasty observations” which had “certainly never been sanctioned by practical decision”.52 Similarly, 
--------------------------------  
41 ibid, 244/955.  
42 (1812) 3 Camp 166, 167, 170 ER 1343. 
43 (1822) 3 Dow & Ry 190. See also Wynne v Jackson (1826) 2 Russell 351, 38 ER 368. 
44 Catherwood has been described as “an unjustified application” of the revenue law rule (Government of India v Taylor 
[1955] AC 491 505 (Viscount Simonds)). 
45 (1850) 5 Ex 275 278, 155 ER 118 119-120. 
46 ibid, 279/120. 
47 Which now is reflected in the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s72(1)(a) (foreign stamp law irrelevant to material validity).  
48 (1871) 9 M 1057. See too Count Joseph Valery v John Scott (1876) 3 R 965 967. 
49 ibid 1060. 
50 Clements v Macauley (1866) 4 M 583 was cited as an instance where a Scottish court ‘gave effect’ to a contract 
violating a foreign revenue law. However, the decision was one on personal jurisdiction only, and the Lord Ordinary had 
rejected an analogy with the revenue law rule. 
51 (n 45) 
52 Gelot (n 48) 1062.  
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Lord Benholme speaks vaguely of “a whole host of decisions” which apparently reject that 
distinction.53 Lord Neaves’ concurrence is more colourful:54 
 
In either case it is a sanction or penalty for breach of revenue laws and for us to interfere in one 
way or another would be making us what we are not – the tax gatherers of a foreign country. 
Let them look after their own affairs; we have enough to do… 
 
This can be contrasted with the dicta of Willes J in Phillips v Eyre.55 While surveying objections to 
a retrospective Jamaican decree, His Lordship considered other instances where foreign laws had 
been rejected. One such example was: 56 
 
…revenue laws … which, for some reason not very obvious, have been put out of consideration 
except in instances where they affect the essential form of contract. 
 
This is a rare, and perhaps the first, instance of an English judge questioning the basis of the revenue 
law rule. This is clearly at variance with the views of the Scottish judges. It is fair to say that Gelot 
pays insufficient regard to Bristow v Sequeville: rather than being hasty passing observations, the 
decision to give effect to a revenue law of the lex loci contractus, where this has the effect of 
invalidating the contract under examination, was central to the outcome of that case, and is consistent 
with the substance/procedure divide. 
 
(c) The Rule Finds a Foothold: The Road to Government of India v Taylor 
 
No reported revenue law rule case appears from 1871 until the publication of Dicey’s first edition of 
The Conflict of Laws in 1896. It is nowhere mentioned in that edition; only the penal law rule 
appears.57 This may be because of the patchiness of the authorities, as discussed above. The only 
foreign fiscal laws which had been at issue were customs laws, navigational laws, and those imposing 
stamp duties. The stamp duty cases show, for the most part, willingness to give effect to the revenue 
laws of a foreign nation, at least where this was material to the validity of the contract. As for custom 
and navigational laws, the cases involved only nations with which Britain’s relations were strained at 
best. There was no instance of a foreign government actually seeking recovery of unpaid tax. 
--------------------------------  
53 ibid 1065. 
54 ibid 1067. 
55 (1870–71) LR 6 QB 1. 
56 Ibid, 27. 
57 AV Dicey, Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws (Stevens & Sons/Sweet and Maxwell, 
1896), 220. 
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Further, a backdrop of the Napoleonic wars, Prussian trade embargos, and the primacy of the nation 
state devalue whatever can be gained from these early cases. Scrutton LJ recognised this in Ralli 
Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar.58 His Lordship reserved liberty to assess the value of the 
revenue law rule in 1920, stating that “[t]he early authorities on this point require reconsideration, in 
view of the obligations of international comity as now understood”.59 Lord Reid made the same point 
in Regazzoni:60 
 
I think it must be borne in mind that they date from a time when international relationships were 
somewhat different and when theories of political economy now outmoded were generally 
accepted. 
 
Lord Somervell of Harrow put the point more pithily: the ‘no notice’ formulation “seems to have been 
based on the principle that freedom and smuggling ‘gang thegither’”.61 
 
Additionally, up to Ralli Brothers, there was no case where the revenue law rule was pivotal to the 
final outcome. Spiller v Turner62 concerned the effect of a foreign revenue law on an English contract. 
Kekewich J decided that case by reference to choice of law principles: the contract was governed by 
English law, and Queensland tax legislation could not affect entitlements which had accrued as a 
matter of English law. There was no need to invoke Lord Mansfield’s mantra. The Court of Session 
was faced with the matter of the recognition of a judgment procured by the Canadian tax authorities 
in Attorney General for Canada v William Schulze,63 but Lord Stormont-Darling proceeded, correctly, 
on the basis that the sum was a penalty, referring solely to Huntington v Attrill.64 
It was on the authority of Sydney Municipal Council v Bull65 that the revenue law rule was added to 
the third edition of Dicey in 1922.66 At first sight, the case appears to remedy the frailty of earlier 
authority: not only did the revenue law rule bar an action by a foreign state to enforce a compulsory 
liability for street repairs, but the claim was pursued by a fellow Commonwealth state. However, no 
British authority was referred to in argument or in the judgment. Counsel relied on an American case 
--------------------------------  
58 [1920] 2 KB 287. 
59 ibid 300. 
60 Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd [1958] AC 301 324. 
61 ibid 329, invoking Burns’s ‘Freedom and Whisky gang thegither’. What Burns would have made of the decision in 
Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (see n 95) is not evident. 
62 [1897] 1 Ch 911. 
63 (1901) 9 SLT 4. 
64 [1893] AC 150. 
65 [1909] 1 KB 7. 
66 AV Dicey and A Berridale Keith, The Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, Stevens & Sons/Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), 230. 
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considering its intra-state application,67 and Huntington v Attrill.68 Grantham J gave no authority for 
his assertion that in revenue cases “it has always been held that an action will not lie outside the 
confines” of the enacting state.69   
 
Moreover, the court’s rejection of the claim on the basis of the revenue law rule is obiter:70 Bull was 
decided on the ground that the Australian legislation expressly empowered only the Sydney Municipal 
Council to bring the claim for improvement charges in New South Wales.71 Further, the effect of that 
legislation was to create a charge over the affected land and, as that land was not located in England, 
the English courts would have no jurisdiction over enforcement of that charge.72 
 
Other cases referencing the revenue law rule prior to Scrutton LJ’s comments in Ralli Brothers either 
did so in passing,73 or only in obiter comments.74 The Eva,75 decided after Ralli Brothers, concerned 
a claim by the Finnish government under legislation which entitled them to 2.5% from every sale of 
a Finnish vessel. Hill J rejected that claim by applying the lex situs rule: the ship was sold in England, 
and so Finnish law could not have governed.76 The revenue law rule was not mentioned, but the case 
nevertheless is cited as authority for the rule in the footnotes to Dicey. 
 
Scrutton LJ’s calls for reassessment were at last heeded in Re Visser,77 where the Queen of the 
Netherlands sought to recover succession duty from the estate of a Dutch national. Tomlin J agreed 
with counsel that few of the prior decisions were of direct assistance, but opined that:78 
 
…the absence of authority for what … is called an elementary proposition, may indicate that 
the proposition is not well founded in principle, but it also may merely indicate that it is so well 
recognized that it has never been put to the test. 
 
--------------------------------  
67 Henry v Sargeant (1843) 13 New Hamp 321. 
68 [1893] AC 150. 
69 Bull (n 65), 12. 
70 And itself can be doubted: see text to (n 130)-(n 135). 
71 Bull (n 65), 12.  
72 ibid, 13. 
73 In Re Duchess of Manchester [1912] Ch 540 (citing In re Tootal’s Trusts (1883) 23 Ch D 532); R v Cotton [1914] AC 
176 195; King of the Hellenes v Brostrom (1923) 16 Lloyd’s List Reports 190 193. 
74 Indian and General Investment Trust v Borax Consolidated [1920] 1 KB 539, a case on all fours with Spiller v Turner; 
and cf London and South American Investment Trust v British Tobacco Company (Australia) Ltd [1927] 1 Ch 107 (where 
an identical decision is reached without mention of the revenue law rule). 
75 [1921] P 454. 
76 Ibid, 457-8. 
77 [1928] Ch 877. 
78 ibid, 882. 
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His Lordship followed this latter inclination, holding that he was bound by the decision in Bull, 
despite, as was submitted above, the fact that the observations therein were obiter. However, even if 
he were not so bound, his own opinion was that the revenue law rule was “well recognized”.79 
 
(d) The Rule Affirmed: Government of India v Taylor  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given his subsequent elevation to a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Tomlin J’s 
judgment in Re Visser proved influential in the decision of the House of Lords in Government of 
India v Taylor. 80 Taylor was the liquidator of an English company with Indian operations, being 
wound up in England. The Indian Government, to which the company was liable for various taxes, 
recovered very little from the company’s remaining assets in India. A proof for the tax owing was 
submitted to the English liquidation, which was rejected by the liquidators on the basis of the revenue 
law rule. This was challenged by the Indian Government, which not only argued that the rule had no 
application in the context of insolvency, but that the rule itself was not so well-established as earlier 
cases had supposed. They argued that the exclusion of foreign law could only be limited to laws 
which were characterised as penal, and most foreign tax legislation would not attract this 
characterisation.81 The House of Lords rejected this challenge and, in so doing, provided clear 
affirmation of the rule’s existence. Lord Somervell thought the rule was self-evident,82 and Viscount 
Simonds described the rule – despite the frailty of the authority explored above – as a “strong 
fortress”83 which was founded on a “formidable array of authority”.84 Lord Keith founded the rule – 
in a passage which has been cited as the basis for each of the exclusionary rules of private 
international law – on the basis that:85 
 
enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the 
taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of another, as 
distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary 
to all concepts of independent sovereignties. 
 
--------------------------------  
79 ibid, 884. 
80 [1955] AC 491, 503-504.  
81 See the argument for the appellant (including, as counsel, Dr JHC Morris, of Dicey, Morris and Collins) at ibid, 494. 
82 ibid, 514. 
83 ibid, 506.  
84 ibid, 504. 
85 ibid, 511. 
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As will be seen later in this paper,86 whatever force this reasoning has,87 it is undermined considerably 
by the fact of the revenue law rule’s disapplication in the insolvency context.  
 
Leaving aside the theoretical quagmires, the application of the revenue law rule as confirmed by 
Government of India v Taylor raises two, distinct, practical questions: 
 
(1) What types of foreign law engage the subject matter scope of the rule? In other words, 
what is a ‘revenue’ law? 
(2) What degree of connection between the claim before the forum and the foreign revenue 
law is required to trigger the operation of the rule.  
 
These questions often are bound up together under the rubric of ‘characterisation’. However, it is 
submitted that they must be kept analytically distinct. It is incorrect to suggest that the British court’s 
interrogation into the application of the exclusionary rules to the case before it is a mere exercise in 
characterisation. Admittedly, the first question is a pure exercise in characterisation: it involves an 
examination of the foreign ‘background law’ by the forum to determine whether or not it falls within 
the particular category of laws proscribed by the exclusionary rules. This exercise is discussed in 
Section III. The second question, however, requires analysing the claim which the claimant has 
advanced before the forum to ascertain its connection with the excluded background law. This, 
however, is not an analysis which is effected on a sliding scale; instead, the cases approach the 
question in a binary fashion. Claims which amount to the enforcement of the foreign revenue law are 
prohibited, whereas claims which merely seek recognition of the foreign revenue law are permitted. 
The expansive approach of the courts to the definition of what constitutes enforcement – extending 
the revenue law rule to preclude as indirect enforcement ordinary private law claims brought for 
compensation or restitution – will be examined and criticised in Section IV. 
 
 
III. Characterising the Background Law: What is a Revenue Law?  
 
The question of what amounts to a ‘revenue law’ is surprisingly underexplored.88 The ‘revenue’ 
nature of a particular law usually is conceded, with the argument focussing on the ‘enforcement’ 
issue.89 This may be because it sometimes is obvious that the law in question pertains to tax matters. 
--------------------------------  
86 See Section V. 
87 Forthcoming work by the author will sustain the argument that this is an inadequate and insufficient explanation for 
the exclusionary rules of private international law.  
88 See A Briggs, ‘The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover’, [2001] Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 280, 281-284. 
89 See Section IV. 
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The primacy of the principle of “no taxation without legislation” means that tax laws usually are 
ensconced in legislation,90 with self-characterising titles such as the “[Indian] Income Tax Act 
1922”.91 This usually gives little room for argument to the contrary. But not every case is clear-cut, 
and it is important to demarcate the precise limits of this exclusionary class, especially as revenue 
claims enjoy specific exceptions to non-enforcement in the insolvency context. This section will 
examine the few cases to consider this question and will extract three indicia of what constitutes a 
“revenue” law.  
 
(a) Function: Protection v Wealth Generation? 
 
Early revenue law rule cases concerned few laws which would be considered to be quintessentially 
‘revenue’ in nature. A large and disparate class of laws was subsumed under the revenue heading. 
Laws imposing customs and tariffs on goods, and stamp duty legislation, obviously are revenue ones. 
Export and import restrictions,92 and navigational laws, on the other hand, do not appear so evidently 
analogous as to justify exclusion on the same basis. Both are designed to protect the commercial 
trading interests of the enacting state, not to exact monies from their subjects. It is on that basis, it is 
submitted, that they should not be classed as revenue laws.93 
 
Two cases support this conclusion. Foster v Driscoll94 concerned an abortive shipment from Glasgow 
of whisky which was bound for prohibition-era USA. It was argued that the US prohibition was a 
‘revenue law’, and that precluding the action for recovery of the contract price was barred by the 
revenue law rule. Sankey LJ held that the US prohibition was “not a mere revenue law”.95 This was 
because the American law “was intended to prevent a malum in se rather than a malum prohibitum”.96 
With respect, it is submitted that this is not the correct distinction. One can imagine a tax being 
imposed to encourage moral rectitude and combat a well-acknowledged evil, a malum in se: an 
obvious example would have been if Prohibition took the form of a heavy tax burden. The logic of 
Foster is that, because there is a strong public policy component justifying the law, then that law can 
be enforced even if it extracts tax. But the question is not one of the turpitude of the conduct against 
which the sanction is directed, or whether or not defiance of its provisions is merely technical in the 
grander scheme of the foreign legal system.  
 
--------------------------------  
90 This may ease the difficulties of characterisation and proof of foreign law. 
91 Enforcement of which was sought in Government of India v Taylor (n 80). 
92 See also King of Italy v De Medici (1918) 34 TLR 623. 
93 They may constitute ‘other public laws’. 
94 [1929] 1 KB 470. 
95 ibid, 515. 
96 ibid, 518.  
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The true question is hinted at by Regazzoni v KC Sethia (1944) Ltd,97 concerning an English contract 
to export jute from India to South Africa via Genoa, in defiance of an Indian law. When repudiated 
by the respondents, the appellant invoked the revenue law rule as a defence, claiming that refusal to 
give effect to the contract would involve giving effect to Indian revenue law. The result in Foster v 
Driscoll was approved, but with no discussion of Sankey LJ’s malum in se/malum prohibitum 
distinction, which solely appears in the argument of counsel for the appellant.98 Lord Keith of 
Avonholm99 and Lord Somervell of Harrow100 thought the revenue law rule had no application. There 
is, however, little explanation as to why this is so. Lord Reid, however, more insightfully compared 
the Indian law to the exchange control case of Kahler v Midland Bank,101 stating that neither could 
be described as a revenue matter.102  
 
Foreign revenue laws and foreign exchange control legislation are treated similarly by the courts, in 
that an action for the enforcement of either will be precluded. However, in Kahler, the House of 
Lords refused to conflate the two.103 Lord Radcliffe viewed Czechoslovakian currency regulations 
as “more than the ‘penal or revenue laws’ of another State the existence of which our courts are 
traditionally disposed to ignore”,104 a view shared by Lord Normand.105 Dicey is more tentative in 
excluding such rules from the domain of ‘revenue laws’,106 but it is submitted that Kahler is correct. 
As was observed in Frankman v Prague Credit Bank,107 foreign exchange controls are “financial 
restrictions and have to do with the financial position and internationally the financial 
relationship[s]”108 of the country enacting those laws. They perform a protective function by 
maintaining the integrity of the financial resources of the enacting state, restricting the abilities of 
non-residents to prey upon the relative volatility of the currency in place there.109 Foreign exchange 
control therefore may form part of the residual ‘other public law’ category.110 
 
Revenue laws, on the other hand, are not predominantly concerned with maintaining economic 
integrity, but rather with actively levying the funds which finance the apparatus of the state. One 
--------------------------------  
97 [1958] AC 301. 
98 ibid, 306.  
99 ibid, 328. 
100 Ibid, 329; cf 330 where His Lordship thought such a characterisation arguable. 
101 [1950] AC 24.  
102 Regazzoni (n 97), 324. 
103 cf King of the Hellenes v Brostrom (1923) 16 Lloyd’s List Reports 190. 
104 Kahler (n 101), 57. 
105 ibid, 36.  
106 Dicey (15th: 2012), [5-030].  
107 [1948] 1 KB 730 (not discussed on appeal). 
108 ibid, 746. 
109 See Proctor (2012) Intro.IV. 
110 See C Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (7th edn, OUP, 2012), ch 16. 
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essential feature is that they create a liability for the taxable person to pay tax, and a correlating power 
on the part of the tax authorities to enforce that liability. Another feature is that they are enacted for 
the purpose of generating revenue for the enacting state. Taking these together, it is easy to see why 
export/import restrictions or foreign exchange controls are not revenue laws: first, they are enacted 
for a protective, rather than generative, purpose. Secondly, they do not create a liability on the part 
of a taxable person to pay. They may create a liability to pay if breached, but that merely supports a 
penal characterisation. The liability under a tax is established by falling within the scope of 
chargeable persons, not by breaching a legal requirement. 
 
(b) State as Beneficiary? 
 
Perhaps the most in-depth treatment of characterisation in the revenue context is Metal Industries 
(Salvage) Ltd v Owners of The ST “Harle”.111 This case concerned a claim by the French government 
to the proceeds of the sale of a ship to satisfy payments owed by the ship’s owners, qua employers, 
to a state health insurance scheme for seamen.112 In applying the revenue law rule to bar the claim, 
Lord Cameron noted the definitional difficulty: 113 
 
There is practically nothing in the world which is not or may not be taxed and few, if any, 
human activities which at one time or another have not been the subject of fiscal imposition. 
At the same time as the complexity and scope of the activities of the state expand, so too 
increase the number and variety of its agencies, and the number and variety of those entrusted 
with the assessment and collection of its revenues. 
 
Nevertheless, his Lordship identified certain features of the background law which supported a 
revenue characterisation. The body claiming entitlement to the payment was a governmental 
organisation, the entitlements were backed by governmental authority, the contributions were 
compulsory, and the schemes which they funded were state-administered.114 Thus, a charge levied to 
generate revenue for a particular purpose, rather than to inflate the consolidated fund, still will be a 
revenue law.  
 
A number of Irish cases explore these requirements and illustrate both the need for a revenue-
generative purpose and for the state to be the ultimate beneficiary. Byrne v Conroy115 concerned a 
--------------------------------  
111 1962 SLT 114. 
112 Cf The Acrux (No 3) [1965] P 391 where the point was not taken in respect of a similar claim by the Italian state.  
113 ST Harle (n 111) 116. 
114 ibid 117. 
115 [1998] 3 IR 1. 
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request to extradite an Irish farmer who allegedly was involved in a scheme to import grain from 
Northern Ireland without paying an agricultural levy due under the EC’s Common Agricultural 
Policy. The farmer’s defence was that this was a “revenue offence”, for which extradition would not 
lie under the legislation. The British legislation under which he was charged referred to it being a 
“tax” offence, but Kelly J concluded that that was a misnomer. The essence of a tax law was one 
enacted to raise revenue, but the levy here was enacted to ensure the free movement of cereal goods 
throughout the Community.116 The Irish Supreme Court upheld this judgment, adding that the 
revenue law rule did not apply to the levies. This was because the charge was not imposed by the UK 
as a sovereign state, but merely was the result of the implementation of an EC-wide charge. 
Therefore, it was not a tax in the sense of a law promulgated with the purpose of raising revenue for 
a particular nation state.117  
 
It had been argued in a previous Irish case that the EC origins of VAT meant that the revenue law 
rule would not apply to an action seeking its payment.118 The court did not deal with this argument, 
but, it is submitted, it is misguided. Although some of the monies raised through VAT are passed 
onto EU institutions, the vast majority is retained by the collecting Member States, which retain some 
discretion to vary the rate of taxation and exclude certain items from its scope. Furthermore, 
excluding EU VAT on this ground would draw an unprincipled distinction in the treatment of EU 
VAT and similar sales taxes imposed by other countries. It is important to emphasise that, at core, 
EU VAT is clearly imposed for the purposes of raising revenue for Member States. 
 
In Transportstyrelsen v Ryanair Ltd,119 the Swedish Transport Authority sought to recover security 
charges levied pursuant to EU law.120 While these charges were to be borne by customers from the 
beginning of 2005, many passengers due to fly after that date had booked beforehand, and Ryanair 
refused to charge them the additional amount. The authority brought a claim in Ireland, which 
Ryanair defended on the basis that this was a claim to recover a foreign revenue debt. Ryanair argued 
that the charges were “non-voluntary pecuniary sums paid to a state agency by members of the public 
for the purposes of ensuring the security of the Swedish state”121 which were set at a flat rate and 
thus clearly were a revenue charge. Transportstyrelsen countered that the purpose of the charges was 
not to raise funds for the benefit of the Swedish government, but to fund the security controls 
--------------------------------  
116 ibid 20. 
117 Ibid, 39. 
118 Bank of Ireland v Meeneghan [1994] 3 IR 111. 
119 [2012] IEHC 226. Cf Case C-302/13, flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines AS v Starptautiska lidosta Riga VAS [2015] ILPr 2 
– such charges would not be a “civil and commercial matter”. 
120 Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
121 Ryanair (n 119), 4.1. 
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mandated by EU law. Hedigan J refused to apply the revenue law rule, as the funds received from 
the charge were passed onto the airport operators, who had to implement the security measures, and 
were therefore those actually prejudiced by non-payment.122  
 
Raised to the level of principle, this could be formulated thus: in order to count as a payment pursuant 
to a revenue law, the ultimate beneficiary must be a foreign government. But that is not precise 
enough: as Briggs notes,123 it can be argued that it is the citizen who is the ultimate beneficiary of the 
income collected pursuant to a tax, for it is used to fund various initiatives and maintain the 
continuing functions of state. Briggs’s preferred criterion is that, if the payer has no opportunity to 
disclaim the benefit for which the charge is levied, it will be a tax.124 In this instance, Ryanair had no 
such opportunity to disclaim the security measures that the charge was intended to fund, and on that 
view, this was a claim to enforce a revenue law. It is perhaps worth noting that the role of the Swedish 
Authority was purely one of collection in order to pass it onto the airport owners to compensate them 
for their outlays. If Ryanair is to be supported (and it is submitted that it should be), it may be on the 
basis that the charge was not designed to raise funds for the Swedish state, but as a statutory quasi-
indemnity for expenditure that otherwise would have to be incurred by a private party. 
 
This reasoning is supported by Weir v Lohr.125 The plaintiff, who had been injured by the negligence 
of the defendant, had his medical bills paid out of a Saskatchewanian scheme of compulsory health 
insurance. The legislation creating that scheme provided that the beneficiaries were to account to the 
government for any recovery in respect of medical fees. Weir sought recovery of the medical fees in 
Manitoba, and Lohr responded by raising the application of the revenue law rule. Tritschler CJQB 
rejected this defence, holding that the claim was not a revenue one, even if the fund to which the 
sums would enure were part of the consolidated sums of the state.126 This approach was followed in 
New Zealand in Connor v Connor,127 which involved a claim for unpaid legal costs by the defendant 
to an Australian divorce action. The plaintiff had been funded by legal aid and, in effect, it was the 
Legal Aid Committee of Victoria which was seeking to recover the costs in New Zealand. Roper J 
suggested that it would be “quite unreal” to regard the action before him as a revenue one simply 
because it “may result in the reimbursement of a fund which has the blessing, or even the financial 
support, of a foreign state”.128 
--------------------------------  
122 ibid, 6.3. 
123 A Briggs, Private International Law in the English Courts (OUP, 2014), [3.21]. 
124 See also A Briggs, ‘The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover’, [2001] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 280. 
125 (1967) 65 DLR (2d) 717. 
126 ibid, 720-21. 
127 [1974] 1 NZLR 632. 
128 ibid, 636-637. 
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It is not clear, however, how these cases square with the decision in Sydney Municipal Council v 
Bull.129 It will be recalled that the revenue law rule precluded a claim brought by a local council in 
respect of compulsory payments levied to cover the cost of repairs to a particular street in Sydney. 
Just as in Weir, Connor, and Ryanair, the sums of which recovery was sought effectively constituted 
payment for specific benefits rendered to the debtor: medical treatment in Weir; legal representation 
in Connor; the security services in Ryanair; and the street repairs in Bull. It has been noted that the 
contrary decision in Bull may not “accord with the growing practice of States and their subordinate 
bodies to furnish services in return for payment”.130 Further, FA Mann argued for a “quasi-
contractual” characterisation of these ‘specific benefit’ cases, for the payments or performances are 
rendered on the footing of statutory terms and thus should not fall within the parameters of the 
revenue law rule.131 
 
This argument was supported by Leslie132 who suggested that it undermines Mann’s support of the 
decision in Metal Industries (Salvage) Ltd v ST “Harle”.133 Leslie suggested that the distinction 
between “a state’s claim to be reimbursed by those benefitting from social security services rendered 
to them” (which will be enforceable) and “claims for contributions paid in advance for such benefits, 
contributions rather like insurance payments” (which are not enforceable) is “surely not sound”.134 
 
However, the different results can be explained if the distinction is between whether or not a 
reasonably specific beneficiary, or class of beneficiaries, was envisaged at the point which the 
liability was called in. In ST Harle, the sums were to be paid into a fund which would make various 
disbursements relating to health insurance and family benefits for those employed as seamen. This is 
a broader class of beneficiaries than those residents of Moore Street who would have benefited from 
the improvements in Bull; the patient and litigant for whom services were paid by the state in Weir 
and Connor; and the Swedish airport which paid for the security arrangements in order that Ryanair 
could use it for arrivals and departures. Moreover, while in those cases the benefit provided to the 
beneficiaries had crystallised, in ST Harle the discretionary nature of the fund meant that there was 
no guarantee that a member of the class of beneficiaries would receive a particular benefit in a 
particular form.  
 
--------------------------------  
129 [1909] 1 KB 7. 
130 P Torremans (ed), Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (15th edn, OUP, 2017), 117-118.  
131 FA Mann, ‘Conflict of Laws and Public Law’, 132 Recueil des Cours 107 (1971-I), 173.  
132 RD Leslie, Aspects of Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1979), 
69-71. 
133 (n 111). 
134 Leslie (n 132), 71.  
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The more tightly drawn the class of beneficiaries is, and the more definite the fact and nature of the 
benefit is, the closer the analogy becomes between the claim to enforce the particular law and an 
ordinary private law action of restitution, subrogation, or indemnification. Removing such instances 
from the scope of the revenue law rule reflects the multifaceted ways in which services may be 
performed by a modern state, and realistically appreciates that these cases do not involve the exertion 
of sovereign authority, but are more akin to a contractual or unjust enrichment claim for (re)payment 
in respect of benefits received by the defendant.  
 
(c) Conclusion 
 
Pulling these threads together, it is submitted that the indicia of revenue laws are that:  
 
a) they impose liability on persons who come, by reason of status or conduct, within their 
scope; 
 
b) liability must be compulsory for those falling within the taxable scope; and; 
 
c) the purpose of creating that liability is to raise income for the enacting state, to exact 
contributions to the consolidated funds or funds for the benefit of specific classes of 
persons or particular governmental/civic functions. If the state acts as a mere collector, 
which passes on that sum to a private person to recoup expenditure, or if the state uses 
that sum to indemnify itself in respect of specific benefits conferred upon a specific party 
or a reasonably identifiable class of beneficiaries, then the law in question should not be 
held to be a revenue one. 
 
It is this final point which may create the most difficulty in practice. But precision is important, 
given that the effect of a revenue characterisation is to raise the spectre of non-enforceability. 
However, that characterisation is only the first hurdle. The next stage – of determining whether the 
claim which has been brought is one for the enforcement of that law – is attended with just as 
much, if not more, complexity. 
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IV. Recognition and Enforcement: The Connected Claim 
   
(a) Introduction 
 
Lord Mansfield’s “no notice” formulation from Holman v Johnson would be so broad as to bar any 
claim which happened to have any connection to a foreign revenue law. This has been long 
doubted,135 and in Re Visser it was stated that: 136 
 
…however unwilling the Courts may be to recognise foreign law, there are certain cases in 
which, although they do not enforce the foreign revenue law, they are bound to recognise some 
of the consequences of that law…. 
   
The preclusive effect of the revenue law rule clearly is directed only at attempts to enforce a foreign 
revenue law, with its recognition viewed as permissible. After the background law is characterised 
as falling within an excluded category, the enforcement/recognition distinction is the fulcrum upon 
which the exclusionary rules hinge. It is, therefore, vital to arrive at a precise definition of the two 
concepts, and of the distinction between them. However, that is no easy task. Dicey recognises that 
the line between enforcement and recognition may well be a fine one;137 and as has been rhetorically 
enquired: is it “not true to say that, in recognising, we give effect?”138 This paper will endeavour to 
provide a more precise definition of the two concepts. However, it is suggested that their essence, 
and the distinction between them, is well captured by Briggs:139 
 
Enforcement: where a party “asks the court to make an order which decrees performance of a 
right or duty created by [the foreign background law]”.140  
 
Recognition: where a party “[asks] the court to make an order based on some other legal right, 
albeit that that right may have derived, at some point in the past, from a law which fell into [an 
excluded category]”.141 
 
--------------------------------  
135 e.g.the stamp duty cases at Section 2(a). 
136 [1928] Ch 877, 888.  
137 Dicey (15th: 2012) [5-023]. 
138 EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, ‘Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company’, (2003) 52(3) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 761, 771. 
139 A Briggs, ‘Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: a Sword and a Shield?’, (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 953, 953-954.  
140 Ibid, 954. 
141 ibid. 
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In other words, enforcement involves an attempt to obtain satisfaction of a claim created by the 
foreign background law, whereas recognition merely involves the court treating the foreign 
background law as datum: an observable factual or legal construct which may be taken into account. 
Maintaining this distinction, however, is no easy task. This can be demonstrated by contrasting two 
cases. 
 
In Rossano v Manufacturers’ Life Insurance Co,142 the plaintiff was an Egyptian customer of the 
defendant insurance company who sought payment after the maturation of three policies. The 
defendant resisted this action inter alia by observing that the Egyptian government had served 
garnishee orders upon them in respect of tax owed by the plaintiff. If the English court ordered the 
premiums to be paid over to the plaintiff, the defendant would be subject to penalties. McNair J was 
unmoved by the hardship this would impose, and rejected the defence as “to allow the defendants to 
set up in diminution or extinction of the plaintiff’s claim a foreign garnishee order … served upon 
them by the Egyptian tax authorities would clearly…”143 run counter to the revenue law rule. Despite 
repeated erroneous references to “recognition” in the judgment,144 Dicey cites the case, without 
critique, as an example of indirect enforcement.145 
  
Rossano may be contrasted with Scottish National Orchestra Society Ltd v Thomson’s Executor.146 
Mrs Thomson died in Stockholm, having executed trust directions in Scotland that sums be paid over 
to several legatees “all free of government duties”. The trustees remitted sums to Sweden so that 
death duties could be satisfied in order for Swedish residents to receive their legacies. The pursuer, 
a residual legatee which saw its entitlement substantially reduced by the payment of the Swedish tax, 
raised an action against the trustees for breach of trust. It was contended that, as a claim for Swedish 
inheritance tax would not be enforceable in Scotland, the Scottish trustees acted improperly in 
remitting funds to Sweden for its satisfaction. Lord Robertson dismissed the action, accepting expert 
evidence to the effect that, under Swedish law, non-payment of death duty would leave the legatees 
open to an action by the Swedish government to recoup the unpaid tax. Allowing the remission to 
stand, therefore, was the only way in which full effect could be given to the wishes of the testatrix.  
  
--------------------------------  
142 [1963] 2 QB 352.  
143 ibid, 377. 
144 ibid, 376.  
145 Dicey (15th: 2012) [5-026] fn117.  
146 1969 SLT 325.  
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Thomson is consistent with previous authority147 and was approved in a subsequent English 
decision.148 It is difficult, however, to see how it is compatible with the result in Rossano. In both 
decisions, the party prejudiced by the potential operation of the revenue law rule would be placed in 
a situation of double distress. In Rossano, if the revenue law rule argument succeeded, the defendant 
would have had to pay (i) the sum which was the subject of the garnishee order to the Egyptian 
government and (ii) the contractual payment due to the plaintiff under the insurance contract. 
Similarly, in Thomson, if the revenue law rule applied, the trustees would be liable for (i) the legacies 
that the Swedish legatees would have been entitled to without making deductions for the payment of 
Swedish death taxes149 and (ii) the legacies which the Scottish legatees would have been entitled to 
if the Swedish death tax had not been paid. In Thomson, the court removed the trustees from this 
difficulty, but, in Rossano, the court’s ordering the defendant to pay the contractual sum to the 
plaintiff placed the defendant in breach of the Egyptian garnishee orders, which, if pursued, no doubt 
would have rendered the defendant liable to the Egyptian government for the same sum. 
 
The decision in Thomson obviously is the fairer one, and that in Rossano the more egregious. 
However, it is not clear that the Egyptian government in Rossano would have benefitted from the 
‘indirect enforcement’ of its revenue law more than the Swedish government did from the 
‘recognition’ of its law in Thomson. This is the difficulty that the slightness of the distinction between 
enforcement and recognition can visit upon parties. It is important, therefore, to establish a precise 
definition of these concepts in this context.  
 
(b) Direct Enforcement 
 
A: The Need for an Unsatisfied Claim 
 
Lord Mackay of Clashfern defined ‘enforcement’ in Williams and Humbert Ltd v W&H Trademarks 
(Jersey) Ltd.150 Counsel for the appellant sought to distil, from Peter Buchanan v McVey,151 a broad 
principle that any action brought at the instigation of a foreign state where, in the event of success, 
the proceeds would be applied towards the purposes of a foreign penal, revenue or other public law, 
would amount to enforcement of such a law. Lord Mackay denied that McVey supported such a 
conclusion. The crucial factor in McVey was that the proceeds of the action would enure solely for 
the benefit of the Inland Revenue, which would use the funds to satisfy the outstanding tax owed by 
--------------------------------  
147 Re Reid (1970) 17 DLR (3d) 199 (BCCA). 
148 Re Lord Cable [1977] 1 WLR 7, 25-26. See also a full examination of the authorities in HSBC Trustee (Hong Kong) 
v Alexander Laufer [2016] HKCFI 1764. 
149 Otherwise, in not paying over these sums as instructed, the trustees would have acted in breach of trust.  
150 [1986] AC 368. 
151 [1954] IR 89. 
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the debtor.152 If there was no outstanding claim to be satisfied, then the action in question could not 
be said to be one amounting to enforcement of the foreign revenue law.153  
 
This spirit was followed by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court,154 holding that the revenue law 
rule was not infringed simply because a foreign state could apply the proceeds of such an action 
towards a revenue debt. Bannister J noted that the logical conclusion of such an argument was that a 
claimant heavily indebted to a foreign tax authority would be precluded from recovering property or 
pursuing a claim in the forum state because of the risk that this would include the likelihood of the 
authority recovering a tax demand.155 
 
Of course, a foreign tax authority never would pursue an action in another jurisdiction unless an 
unsatisfied tax claim was owed to them. The point, however, may be important to private parties, as 
demonstrated by Air India Ltd v Caribjet Inc.156 An arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the 
respondents, but, before the award could be enforced, the Indian Revenue made a demand that the 
award in favour of the respondents be paid to them, to go towards satisfying a provisional tax liability. 
The applicants sought to stay the enforcement of the award, arguing that a set-off existed in their 
favour, for previously they had made a payment to the Indian Revenue on behalf of the respondents. 
The respondents argued that permitting a stay of the execution of the award to allow that set-off 
would be tantamount to enforcement of the Indian revenue law. Judge Chambers QC disagreed, 
rejecting the argument that Lord Mackay’s remarks in Williams and Humbert were obiter.157 As the 
prior payment had satisfied the tax owing in this instance, no question of enforcement was 
involved.158 
 
B: Revenue Authority as Sole Creditor 
 
The foreign revenue authority may be one of a number of creditors standing to benefit from the 
recovery action. Does the fact that some benefit may enure to a foreign tax authority preclude the 
claims of the other creditors? This question arose in Ayres v Evans.159 A New Zealand citizen was 
rendered bankrupt there, owing over half of his debts to the New Zealand tax authorities. The debtor 
--------------------------------  
152 Williams and Humbert (n 150) 440F-G. 
153 ibid 441A. 
154 First Nevis Trust Company Ltd v Grossberg, Unreported, 15th January 2014 (BVI). 
155 ibid [100] (Bannister J). See similarly 160088 Canada Inc v Socoa International (1997) CILR 409 (recognizing the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court over tax-exempt Cayman company does not amount to the enforcement of the revenue laws 
of the foreign state). 
156 [2002] All ER (Comm) 76.  
157 ibid [52]. 
158 ibid. Cf the German decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of 17th December 2015: Az. I ZR 275/14: argument that set-
off arising from payment of Russian tax not admissible in German proceedings. 
159 (1981) 56 FLR 235.  
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was entitled to inherit from his father’s estate in New South Wales, so a letter of request was directed 
to the Australian court to ingather the estate and remit it to New Zealand. When challenged, the 
Federal Court recognised that previous cases160 involved the tax authority as sole creditor. It was 
conceded that it would be practically impossible to pay the inheritance to the non-revenue creditors 
to the exclusion of the revenue creditors. Fox J held that the revenue law rule did not apply, as its 
application would prejudice non-revenue creditors just as much as revenue creditors and, as a result, 
“public policy would rebound”.161 
 
Ayres was applied in England in Teletalk Mobil Engineers v Jyske Bank,162 to the effect that the 
revenue law rule has no application where the tax authorities are one among a group of creditors. The 
practical desirability of such a decision is clear, but neither in Ayres nor in Teletalk is a principled 
basis given for the conclusion. It is obvious in both that the result would be the satisfaction of an 
otherwise unsatisfied revenue claim, a naked instance of enforcement. It is possible to say that 
allowing the claim in such circumstances would not solely amount to the enforcement of the foreign 
revenue law.163 If there is a mixed purpose to the claim, or if another, non-sovereign, creditor would 
stand to benefit,164 then the revenue law rule should not apply, for its application would needlessly 
prejudice other creditors.  
 
C:  Reciprocal Arrangements 
 
The notorious baldness of the rule against direct enforcement makes it unlikely that foreign states 
will attempt that course. However, direct enforcement of tax is readily countenanced by numerous 
international mechanisms which have been transposed into UK law. HMRC, in many circumstances, 
must give assistance to requests from EU Member States under the Mutual Assistance in Recovery 
Directive.165 This applies to “all taxes and duties of any kind” levied by an authority of a Member 
State.166 The authorities of one Member State may make a request to the authorities of another to 
recover tax owing to it in that latter state.167 The effect of such a request, if the debtor does not 
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successfully dispute it,168 is that the foreign tax debt shall be treated as if it is a domestic debt, 
allowing HMRC to use all powers which it would use to recover analogous domestic taxes.169 While, 
in form, this proceeds on the counterfactual that the tax is a domestic one, in substance it amounts to 
the enforcement of a foreign revenue law. 
 
Beyond the EU, double taxation treaties between the UK and other states may contain provisions 
relating to collection assistance, usually based on Article 27 of the OECD Model Convention. 
Authority to conclude such agreements was affirmed by the Finance Act 2006.170 To date, the UK 
had entered into double taxation treaties with 134 states.171 Twenty-six of these contain collection 
assistance provisions modelled on the OECD provisions,172 but, since the Finance Act 2006 conferred 
authority to make such provisions, roughly twice this number of treaties have been entered into, or 
amended, without such provisions being included, suggesting that the mechanisms are not universally 
attractive.  
 
Nevertheless, these recovery provisions represent a further stripping back of the revenue law rule. 
There are signs that the courts do not lament this, and thus will interpret these provisions liberally. 
In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Ben Nevis (Holdings).173 HMRC brought a claim to 
recover tax in England on behalf of the South African tax authority. The tax became due before the 
treaty with South Africa was amended to include the mutual assistance provisions, and the taxpayer 
argued that giving such retrospective effect to its provisions would be contrary to public policy. Lloyd 
Jones LJ dismissed this challenge and forcefully brought home the minor status of the revenue law 
rule:174 
 
…the Revenue [Law] Rule did not exist for the benefit or protection of taxpayers… whatever 
its precise basis, it seems clear that it lies in relationships between sovereign States and that its 
abrogation, therefore, cannot be regarded as an injustice to a party seeking to resist enforcement 
--------------------------------  
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of a tax liability. From a taxpayer's point of view, the Revenue Rule is a collateral benefit and 
he cannot complain of injustice if he is deprived of it. 
 
(c) Indirect Enforcement 
 
A: Introduction 
 
The revenue law rule has been extended to cover instances of ‘indirect’ enforcement, which 
encompasses claims which, though not founded upon a foreign revenue law, substantively would 
have the effect of satisfying a foreign tax claim if permitted. This may occur where a third party 
raises a claim, and may apply even to block a claim which solely is founded in private law doctrine. 
For example, a settlement agreement may be reached between the debtor and the tax authority, 
creating a contractual liability alongside the public law liability. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
held that enforcement of a judgment enforcing such a contractual obligation will be barred by the 
revenue law rule on grounds of indirect enforcement.175 
 
Furthermore, a claim may be formulated in delict, unjustified enrichment, or breach of fiduciary duty, 
craving compensation or restitution, the effect of which in substance will be to recover the unpaid 
tax, if successful. On one view, this could have been viewed simply as recognition of the foreign tax 
law, by reference to which the remedial amount would be quantified. However, another – less 
satisfactory – approach has been adopted.  
 
B: Private Law Actions by Liquidators 
 
The first case extending the revenue law rule to bar a private law claim was the Irish case of Peter 
Buchanan v McVey.176 A liquidator appointed by HMRC sought to recover tax owed by a Scottish 
company by bringing a claim against its director in Ireland alleging breach of fiduciary duties. 
Kingsmill Moore J held that the revenue law rule would bar the liquidator’s action, and this was 
upheld by the Irish Supreme Court.177  
 
This decision was relied upon by Lord Keith of Avonholm in his speech in Government of Taylor v 
India.178 However, it is crucial to observe the precise use which His Lordship made of McVey. First, 
as Taylor concerned a situation of obvious direct enforcement, any approval given to McVey strictly 
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would be obiter. Secondly, despite describing it as “an admirable judgment”179 and “able and 
exhaustive”,180 Lord Keith nowhere approves the actual result in that case. All that he presses McVey 
into service for is to quote from Kingsmill Moore J’s exploration of the rule’s rationale; Lord Keith 
was not concerned with the rule’s application. Therefore, as was observed by Lord Mackay in 
Williams and Humbert:181 
 
It cannot be said that any approval was given by the House to the decision in the Buchanan 
case except to the extent that it held that there is a rule of law which precludes a state from 
suing in another state for taxes due under the law of the first state. 
 
This was overlooked when the first instance of private law ‘indirect enforcement’ came before the 
English courts in QRS 1 ApS v Frandsen.182 Counsel for the liquidator conceded that the case was 
indistinguishable from McVey,183 concerning as it did an action by a liquidator, on behalf of the 
Danish tax authorities, for compensation for breach of a director’s duties under Danish and English 
law. It was not argued that the result in McVey had not actually been approved in Taylor. Rather, 
Simon Brown LJ discusses McVey under the heading of “binding authority in point”,184 which, as 
stated above, is incorrect. Moreover, His Lordship states185 that approval was given to McVey in Re 
State of Norway’s Application,186 but there is no discussion, never mind approval, of McVey to be 
found within that case. It does not feature in the list of cases referred to by the House of Lords, the 
Court of Appeal, or counsel.187 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal applied McVey by analogy, barring 
the claim of the Danish liquidator. 
 
McVey and Frandsen were followed in Singapore in Relfo Ltd v Varsani.188 A director of Relfo Ltd, 
heavily indebted to HMRC, transferred £500,000 to a Latvian company, rendering Relfo insolvent. 
On the same day, a payment of the dollar equivalent was made by a Lithuanian company to Varsani, 
a family friend of that director. The liquidator alleged that Varsani was liable in unconscionable 
receipt as he was aware the funds were paid in breach of fiduciary duty. Varsani defended the claim, 
not only on the merits, but on the basis that, as HMRC were the sole creditor of Relfo Ltd, and it was 
their chosen liquidator bringing the claim, this was an indirect attempt to enforce the tax laws of the 
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UK. After finding that the defendant was in unconscionable receipt of the payment, 189 Judith Prakash 
J, following McVey and Frandsen, held that any remedy would be barred by the revenue law rule.190 
 
C: A Different Approach? 
 
One may doubt whether this line of authority is sustainable in light of the decision of the House of 
Lords in Revenue Customs Commissioners v Total Network.191 The defendants allegedly conspired 
with others to perpetuate a carousel VAT fraud of a value of around £2 million. The Value Added 
Tax Act 1994 provided some means of recovery against persons assisting such fraud, but did not 
allow a claim to be brought against foreign parties who were not UK VAT-registered. The defendants 
were outside the reach of those provisions, and HMRC, therefore, brought a tortious claim against 
them for unlawful means conspiracy. 
 
Article 4 of the Bill of Rights 1689 provides that parliamentary authority is required for the Crown 
to claim monies from its subjects: no taxation without representation.192 Total Network alleged that 
the claim in tort contravened this, amounting to an exaction without the legitimising imprimatur of 
Parliament. Each of their Lordships disagreed with this in principle: a claim for damages would not 
fall foul of the prohibition on exaction based on prerogative alone.193 The majority of their Lordships 
considered there to be no constitutional bar to the Revenue Commissioners’ pursuit of a private law 
claim, even where an express statutory mechanism exists for recouping the tax which that action is 
designed to recover.194 The suggestion, therefore, is that, for the purposes of domestic law, such 
claims are to be classified as ordinary private law ones. They do not amount to an attempt to exact 
tax without proper democratic legitimacy. Why then should that not be the approach in private 
international law? If characterisation is a matter for English law, as the law of the forum, it would 
seem inconsistent to have one view as to what amounts to enforcement of revenue law in domestic 
law, thereby allowing HMRC to recover, and another in international private law, which would 
preclude a foreign tax authority from recovering. 
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There are signs that the spirit of Total Network is seeping through to private international law.195 
Even prior to that decision, a Manx court expressed doubts as to whether or not it would follow the 
result in McVey.196 More recently, HMRC sought to buttress English worldwide freezing injunctions 
by obtaining an interim Mareva injunction from the Hong Kong courts. The respondents sought for 
the claim to be struck out as falling foul of the revenue law rule. It was contended that HMRC were 
trying to recover the output tax paid to the company that was a front for the first respondent, and was 
plainly an attempt at extraterritorial enforcement, albeit indirectly. This was rejected at first 
instance.197 Influenced heavily by the sham nature of the entire scheme, the judge agreed with HMRC 
that the English action in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy was merely a private law claim, and 
thus enforceable.198  
 
The judge distinguished McVey and Frandsen on the basis that both concerned a genuine commercial 
operation, where the tax debts had been incurred in the ordinary operation of a normal business, 
whereas the instant case concerned a fraudulent scheme to defraud HMRC.199 The Hong Kong Court 
of Appeal upheld this decision,200 with Hon Tang VP noting:201 
 
I find it difficult to accept that enforcement of a judgment to recover the loot should fail on the 
ground that it amounts to an indirect enforcement of foreign revenue law. I do not believe that 
Government of India compels such a conclusion. If it does, I am respectfully of the view that 
our courts may wish to consider whether Government of India should be followed. 
 
In related proceedings in Singapore,202 the Court of Appeal did not reach so definite a conclusion. It 
merely held that the case was not a “plain and obvious case for striking out”. However, this still 
demonstrates that the approach to indirect enforcement cannot be assumed to be obviously correct. 
 
D: Unjust Enrichment Claims for Overpayment 
 
A claim brought against a party allegedly unjustly enriched at the expense of another may bear some 
connection with a tax law claim. This may arise in a dispute between the state and the citizen, such 
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as where a taxpayer has paid tax that was not due, or receives an undue benefit.203 It also may arise 
in a dispute between two private parties, such as where C pays tax that was payable by D, and seeks 
to recover the outlay from D. Assuming that the enriched party is sued before a Scots or English 
forum, would the revenue law rule preclude either type of claim? 
 
It is suggested that such claims would not be precluded. Not only is there no unsatisfied tax claim in 
the background, but also the tax authority never had a tax claim in respect of the sum that was paid 
over – hence why the enrichee’s retention of the money is unjustified. Although there is some debate 
as to the extent to which the ground rendering the enrichment unjust is furnished by private or public 
law,204 it is the private law mechanisms of unjust enrichment which effects recovery. The only 
liability on the part of the enrichee is one which arises from the principle that one should not be 
unjustly enriched at the expense of the other. The foreign revenue law does not enter into it. 
 
This reasoning, it is submitted, also holds true in those cases where one private party satisfies the tax 
claim owed by another and seeks to be indemnified for this.205 This situation was discussed by the 
Court of Appeal in the unreported case of Yakeley v Sir M Macdonald Partnership.206 When the 
plaintiff brought an action in contract for unpaid fees, the defendants raised, as a set-off, the fact that 
they had paid tax on the plaintiff’s behalf. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, on the basis 
that allowing the set-off would violate the revenue law rule.  
 
Eveleigh LJ’s judgment, albeit relating to only a summary judgment, is interesting. His Lordship 
clearly did not favour the application of the revenue law rule. One reason for this was that it would 
deny recovery even where a party had expressly agreed to indemnify the counterparty, a conclusion 
which Eveleigh LJ described as “surprising”.207 His Lordship also observed that the “no notice” 
formulation would bar recovery of the price paid for goods wherever that included a VAT 
component.208 An appeal against the granting of summary judgment was allowed, but there is no 
record of a final determination. 
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Re CJ CGV,209 a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, supports this reasoning. A Korean 
company obtained a judgment from the Korean courts holding an Australian company liable for 
unjust enrichment after its tax liability had been satisfied by the Korean party. The judgment creditor 
thereafter sought enforcement of that judgment in Victoria. 
 
The judgment debtor argued that such a judgment was plainly one relating to a revenue law, and thus 
could not be enforced. After discussing McVey,210 Landsdowne JA distinguished the case before her 
on the basis that the Korean revenue authorities were not “propelling” or “participating in” the 
Korean proceedings in any way.211 Furthermore, the liability was a matter of private law, based on 
unjust enrichment, not public law.212 It was irrelevant that the Korean parties had paid the tax liability 
voluntarily.213 Her Honour relied on an earlier, unreported Victorian case, which had held that a 
judgment providing for the satisfaction of a contractual indemnity relating to local municipality rates 
should be enforced, in spite of “some remote connection with taxation or charges”.214 This confirms 
the validity of Eveleigh LJ’s observations regarding express indemnities,215 and suggests that a 
similar unjust enrichment claim should succeed in Scotland and England.  
 
A shortcut to the same result is to apply Lord Mackay’s speech in William & Humbert.216 In each of 
the cases, there could be no question of enforcement, as there was no unsatisfied revenue debt 
owing.217 This had been discharged by the payment for which the action sought restitution. This point 
was alluded to in CJ GCV: “[o]nce the tax was paid by the plaintiff, revenue collection ceased”.218 
 
 
(d) Recognition and Assistance 
 
Where a party attempting to evade foreign tax founds upon the revenue law rule to benefit from his 
delinquencies, the fact that that party’s conduct would be contrary to a foreign revenue law can be 
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taken into account to bar their success. In Re Emery’s Investment Trusts,219 US tax law was taken 
into account when barring a husband from rebutting the presumption of advancement to show that a 
transfer to his wife was not a gift. The transfer was made to evade US tax, and the court observed the 
requirements of the US Tax Code in holding that this turpitude meant he did not come to equity with 
clean hands, and thus he was barred from rebutting the presumption.220  
 
The opposite conclusion was reached, without reference to Re Emery, by the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal in Damberg v Damberg.221 A father had transferred land in Germany to his children in 
order to evade German capital gains tax. In an ensuing divorce action, the children claimed that the 
German properties did not form part of the matrimonial assets, but instead were owned outright by 
them. The father sought to rebut the presumption of advancement to demonstrate that the land was 
not transferred as a gift, but was held by his children on resulting trust for him. Heydon JA held that 
allowing the presumption to stand would be to enforce the German tax law, because such a decision 
would in effect impose a condition that the father pay the amount of German tax which should have 
been paid. It is respectfully submitted that this is incompatible with the definition of ‘enforcement’ 
adopted in this paper:222 at the time of the trial, there was no legal obligation under the German tax 
law to pay the amount which, but for the transfer to his children, the father would have had to pay. 
There was no unsatisfied German tax claim: as far as the authorities there were concerned, the tax 
liability had been satisfied by the payments made by the children. The effect of Damberg is to extend 
the concept of enforcement to include cases where the court’s decree may give rise to tax liability 
under a foreign law, and thereafter demand the satisfaction of that liability. It is submitted that that 
is too remote a situation to fall within the mischief of the revenue law rule, and that the approach in 
Re Emery, allowing the recognition of the foreign tax law in those circumstances, is to be preferred.  
 
Another instance of recognition of foreign revenue law may arise when determining the personal law 
of a legal or natural person. It has been held relevant for determining where the centre of main 
interests of a company is located that the jurisdiction of the registered office is one which has obvious 
tax incentives, for this may point away from it being the real place where business is conducted.223 
Similarly, where an individual has effected a change of residence in order to avoid incurring higher 
taxes, or an investigation by foreign tax authorities, the English courts have generally been willing 
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to take this into account in assessing the extent of the propositus’ connection to England.224 Further, 
a court may take into account the existence of heavy foreign tax liabilities when permitting an 
executor to abandon foreign property where those liabilities exceed the assets located in the foreign 
jurisdiction.225 
 
In Re State of Norway’s Application (No 2),226 the House of Lords also held that giving assistance to 
a foreign tax authority was not precluded by the revenue law rule. This was not categorised as 
“recognition” of a foreign tax law, and instead the term “assistance” seems to be more apposite. But 
the distinction between enforcement, recognition, and assistance may not always be easy to draw. 
This was recognised by Leggatt J in X AG v A Bank.227 A subpoena was served on a corporation’s 
London bank compelling the production of documents to assist the US authorities in conducting a 
tax investigation, which was to go before a Grand Jury. When the bank evinced an intention to 
comply with that subpoena, the corporation sought to prevent disclosure. The bank contended that 
permitting disclosure would not amount to enforcement of the revenue laws of the US. It was 
submitted that comity required the English court not to impede the tax investigation. Leggatt J opined 
that this submission was unrealistic:228 
 
The fact is that the gamekeeper is invited to turn a blind eye whilst the poacher takes a brace 
of pheasants, or three pheasants. In this context, it appears to me that not impeding involves a 
measure of assistance, and, indeed, approbation…. 
 
Yet, following Re State of Norway’s Application, it is clear that such assistance now would not be 
caught by the revenue law rule. The starkest example of this fact is that the rule will not preclude an 
authority from acceding to the request of a foreign state for the extradition of a person in Britain in 
connection with foreign revenue offences. This theoretically is tantamount to enforcement, and, in 
practice, has far more severe consequences than ever could flow from a money judgment against the 
taxpayer. However, provisions of the Extradition Act 1870, which made no express mention of 
revenue offences, were held to have implicitly displaced the rule by vague language.229 The 
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Extradition Act 2003230 and the European Arrest Warrant system231 contain language which make it 
clear that revenue offences are extraditable, and thus the revenue law rule cannot be prayed in aid to 
block an extradition; if the statutory criteria are established, extradition will follow. 
 
(e) Conclusion 
 
It is suggested that the above analysis shows that the enforcement/recognition distinction is 
productive only of confusion and injustice. The distinction is confusing because the line between the 
two often shades into the imperceptible, and it is not evident why all instances of recognition should 
be prima facie permissible, while no instance whatsoever of enforcement can be countenanced. It is 
unjust because the exclusion of cases of even indirect enforcement may allow a wrongdoer to benefit 
by using the revenue law rule as a shield, to the detriment of the foreign tax authority and its other 
taxpayers. Indirect enforcement easily may be explicable as cases of recognition: the foreign tax law 
merely provides data, normally for the purposes of computation of loss, which is then inputted into 
the mechanics of recovery furnished by the applicable private law. Moreover, a foreign court merely 
is being asked to redress the norm of corrective justice which the taxpayer’s actions have upset; it is 
not itself involved in the distributive process of collecting tax. 
 
A more precise formulation may be supplied by the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Brokaw v 
Seatrain UK Ltd.232 The US government purported to impose a levy on a ship travelling to the UK 
as it was on the high seas to recover a tax debt owed by its owners. The Court of Appeal refused to 
enforce this because of the revenue law rule,233 but the decision may be explained more simply as an 
application of the lex situs rule. His Lordship, however, opined that things may have been different 
if the US tax authorities had obtained title to the goods while they were in US territory, and 
proceedings were brought in England to recover them after removal from US jurisdiction.234 This is 
because the tax authorities could plead their claim simply relying upon their possessory title, without 
reference to the revenue law. In other words, they would be founding on a right granted by private 
law, and not the foreign tax law. This is in line with the approach to ‘other public laws’ taken by the 
Court of Appeal in Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries.235 The distinction advanced there was 
between claims based on private law, which are enforceable, and those pleaded with reliance on the 
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foreign public law alone, which are not.236 It is not clear why a similar distinction is not operable in 
the revenue context.  
 
This especially given the case that the distinction finds an analogue in the EU concept of ‘civil and 
commercial matters’. This is the concept which determines the positive scope of most EU private 
international law instruments. In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Sunico,237 the Revenue 
issued proceedings in England alleging that Sunico was complicit in a carousel fraud, and claimed 
compensatory damages quantified at a sum commensurate with the amount of unpaid tax. Supporting 
proceedings were launched in Denmark, which required the Danish court to ascertain whether or not 
the English judgment would be within the scope of “civil and commercial matters” for the purposes 
of Article 1 of the Brussels I Regulation. The matter was referred to the CJEU. 
 
Advocate General Kokott opined that the relationship between HMRC and Sunico was essentially a 
private law one. Sunico was a third party not directly liable for VAT, so it could not be said that the 
action was brought in exercise of HMRC’s public powers.238 Furthermore, the only power exercised 
by HMRC was the power to invoke the adjudicatory jurisdiction of a court to settle a dispute between 
two litigants. HMRC was acting in the same capacity as any private litigant, and was subject to 
ordinary rules of civil procedure and execution.239 As to the subject matter of the action, the right of 
HMRC to recover tortious damages did not stem from the exercise of public powers, but from the 
violation of HMRC’s rights which the tort of conspiracy protected. As AG Kokott put it, this right 
did not “accrue to the state in its capacity as an organ of sovereign power” but rather stemmed from 
HMRC’s being harmed by a tortious act “whose victim can in principle be anyone”.240 The fact that 
the sums claimed by way of compensation were exactly the same as the output VAT lost by HMRC 
was said to be of merely background importance.241 The damages which HMRC would be entitled 
to claim would not be reduced pro tanto by any payment of tax by the directly taxable person. This 
demonstrated that the object of the action was not to recover lost tax, but to vindicate the infringement 
of HMRC’s right. The claim in tort thus was legally independent of the power to recover the tax, 
even if, factually, they achieved the same aim. Therefore, the conspiracy claim was a civil and 
commercial matter within the scope of the Regulation.242 
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The Court followed the Advocate General’s reasoning, and its judgment essentially tracks her 
opinion. HMRC’s claim amounted to a civil and commercial matter: Sunico was not directly liable 
for VAT,243 the claim was brought under the English law of tort244 and was not subject to any special 
procedure,245 and it was irrelevant that the damages corresponded with the output tax liability of the 
absconding party.246  
 
The reasoning in Sunico is striking. A clear attempt at indirect enforcement of British tax law was 
held to be a civil and commercial matter for the purposes of the Brussels Regime. The analysis is 
very broad. The Advocate General described HMRC’s action as a claim in respect of an act “whose 
victim can in principle be anyone”.247 While it is true that, in principle, anyone can sue for the tort of 
unlawful means conspiracy, it is only HMRC which could sue for the particular type of conspiracy 
in that case. It had, at its core, an allegation that the tortfeasor conspired to commit the crime of 
defrauding the revenue; a crime of which clearly only HMRC may be a victim. This suggests that the 
analysis operates at a very high level of generality. It appears that it is only the general cause of action 
which is relied upon by the public authority – in Sunico, the tort of unlawful means conspiracy – 
which the court should take into account when assessing whether or not the matter is a civil and 
commercial one. If that cause of action is one which is open to private parties generally, then it is 
irrelevant that the particular loss visited upon the public authority, or the means used to inflict that 
loss, is of a nature to which only a public authority could fall victim. This runs in direct opposition 
to the caselaw discussed above248 on the domestic revenue law rule, providing yet another reason for 
doubting the breadth of ‘enforcement’ in this context.  
 
In the next section, we will consider the most substantial exception to the revenue law rule: even if 
the claim is one for the enforcement for foreign tax law, then that claim will be enforced if it is lodged 
as a claim in the debtor’s insolvency. As shall be seen, this exception has the clear potential to 
swallow the rule as a whole. 
 
 
  
--------------------------------  
243 Sunico (n 237), [38] 
244 ibid [37]. 
245 ibid [39].  
246 ibid [41]. The Court and Advocate General were troubled by the fact that HMRC had used powers conferred on it by 
an EU Directive to request information from other EU tax authorities to assist its pursuit of the claim: AG[45]; CJEU at 
[42]-[43]. With respect, it is submitted that the use of public powers in the pre-action recovery of evidence is too remote 
a consideration to affect the classification of the subsequent action.  
247 ibid AG[49]. See also the Court at [37]. 
248 See Section IV(c)B. 
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V. The Revenue Law Rule and Cross-Border Insolvencies 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The revenue law rule may be of paramount significance in the cross-border insolvency context. A 
recalcitrant tax debtor may be wound up in the jurisdiction where that tax is due, in which case the 
revenue law rule forms no barrier to its recovery. But practical reasons may compel the tax authority 
to lodge its claim in a foreign liquidation, or even to initiate foreign proceedings. 
  
Government of India v Taylor249 concerned this situation. The decision there may be justifiable on 
grounds of consistency, for this was nothing other than an attempt at direct enforcement, relying upon 
the entitlement created by foreign tax legislation. But there are real reasons to query the desirability 
of such a rule. It directly contradicts what has come to be seen as the guiding philosophy of cross-
border insolvency.250 The principle of unity of bankruptcy provides that, for evident economic 
reasons, it is preferable to have a single bankruptcy proceeding in one jurisdiction, to deal with the 
entirety of the insolvent’s estate. The application of the revenue law rule in Taylor ruptures this unity. 
Instead, the insolvency of a debtor who has incurred liability to tax in numerous states necessarily 
must be fragmented. Tax authorities will be able only to prove locally, possibly resulting in a number 
of independent insolvency processes, subject to the local law, with little to no chance of coordination. 
This obviously inefficient situation inevitably entails greater expense, with correspondingly 
diminishing returns for the creditors. It is no doubt to militate against such detrimental practical 
consequences that the operation of the revenue law rule has been curtailed in these circumstances. 
This paper has previously noted the judicial disapplication of the rule where a tax authority is one of 
a number of creditors;251 now it will consider the specific legislative abrogation of the rule in the 
insolvency context.  
 
(b) The European Insolvency Recast Regulation 
 
The first incursion into Government of India v Taylor was made by the European Insolvency 
Regulation (“EIR”),252 which since has been recast.253 Article 7(2)(h) provides that the law of the 
place where proceedings have been opened will determine the admission of claims against the 
--------------------------------  
249 [1955] AC 491: see Section II(d). 
250 See e.g. LA Bebchuk and AT Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies’, 42 The Journal of 
Law and Economics (1999) 775; cf F Tung, ‘Is International Bankruptcy Possible?’, 23(1) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 31 (2001). 
251 See Section IV(b)B. 
252 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings.  
253 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings 
(recast). 
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insolvent’s estate. That rule is subject to Article 2(12), which defines those “creditors” having a right 
to lodge a claim under Article 53254 as encompassing “the tax authorities… of Member States”. 
Therefore, where a debtor has its centre of main interests (‘COMI’) within an EU Member State, the 
revenue law rule cannot operate to preclude the lodging of proof by the tax authorities of another 
Member State255 for insolvencies falling within the scope of the Regulation.  
 
Article 53 simply refers to the right of such creditors to lodge claims, and does not speak of the 
satisfaction of such claims. However, it would wholly denude Article 53 if liquidators could go on 
to rely on the revenue law rule to refuse to make a distribution to such creditors. The Article does not 
explicitly address the question of whether such a creditor is able to petition for the winding up of a 
debtor, which will be most pressing where the tax authorities are the main or sole creditor. However, 
the Irish High Court has held very sensibly in Re Cedarlease256 that HMRC, qua tax authority of 
another Member State, could petition for the winding up of a company having its COMI in Ireland.257 
 
This rightfully has been described as “a considerable advance” over the common law position.258 Its 
great benefit is that total reciprocity is ensured: it abrogates the revenue law rule only in respect of 
those Member States which also apply the EIR, which are bound to afford the same courtesy to proofs 
submitted by HMRC. It could be observed, legitimately, that abrogation of the revenue law rule in 
this context owes much to the aims of European integration and single market considerations. 
Therefore, once one moves outside of the European context, there is, short of a treaty, no guarantee 
of reciprocity, and therefore may be no political impetus mandating the permissive treatment of 
foreign revenue claims.  
 
(c) Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 
  
Beyond the geographical confines of the EU, the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency also has some implications for the revenue law rule. The model law contains two versions 
of Article 13, relating to the powers of foreign creditors. One contains no reference to revenue 
creditors, but an alternative explicitly reaffirms the exclusion of claims “concerning tax and social 
--------------------------------  
254 Ex Article 39.  
255 Excluding Denmark: The Commissioners for Customs and Excise v The Arena Corporation Limited [2003] EWHC 
3032 (Ch) [41]-[47] (Lawrence Collins J). 
256 [2005] IEHC 67, [2005] 1 IR 470. 
257 The same result can be achieved under the MARD (see Section IV(b)C) by HMRC presenting a bankruptcy petition 
on behalf of another Member State: Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Smart [2016] All ER (D) 158 (Jun).  
258 G Moss, I Fletcher, and S Issacs (eds), The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (3rd edn, OUP, 2016), [8.443]. 
The authors opine that the inclusion of tax authorities in Article 2(1) means that foreign tax claims cannot be challenged 
under Article 26 on grounds of public policy, but surely that exception still can be invoked where, for instance, the 
discriminatory nature of the foreign tax law offends public policy. 
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security obligations”. It is unclear whether this means that the default position, silent as to the position 
of revenue creditors, was intended to remove the barrier to submitting a proof of debt for foreign 
revenue creditors. The implementation of the Model Law by states does little to resolve this 
ambiguity.  
 
To date, the Model Law has been enacted in forty-five jurisdictions.259 Twenty-eight of those 
jurisdictions adopted the alternative reading, or otherwise provided that tax claims are 
unenforceable.260 Five of the enactments do not contain an Article 13 equivalent,261 and one 
enactment imports the Model Law wholesale without indicating which formulation is adopted.262 
One enactment seems to countenance the enforcement of foreign revenue claims, but not in terms 
which reflect of Article 13.263 Eight states adopted the wording in the text which does not expressly 
exclude revenue claims,264 but this does not necessarily mean that those states will permit the 
enforcement of foreign tax claims in an insolvency. Such claims may still be excluded by that 
system’s version of the revenue law rule, or by the operation of the Model Law’s public policy 
provision.265 
 
Only two enactments of the Model Law definitively remove the application of the revenue law rule. 
The first to do so was the UK enactment:266 the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (“CBIR 
2006”).267 Articles 13(1) and 13(2) reflect the text of the Model Law without the footnote alternative, 
but paragraph (3) is added: 
 
A claim may not be challenged solely on the grounds that it is a claim by a foreign tax or social 
security authority but such a claim may be challenged—  
 
(a) on the ground that it is in whole or in part a penalty, or 
(b) on any other ground that a claim might be rejected in a proceeding under British 
insolvency law. 
--------------------------------  
259 See  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html.  
260 Australia, Benin, the British Virgin Islands, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Gibraltar, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, New Zealand, Niger, Poland, Senegal, the Seychelles, Togo, and the United States. 
261 Canada, Japan, Serbia, South Africa, and South Korea. 
262 The Philippines enactment incorporates the whole of the Model Law by reference. This may be a selection of the 
‘default’ rule in the main text, with no express exclusion. 
263 The Slovenian enactment. 
264 Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Mexico, Romania, Montenegro, and Uganda.  
265 Article 6.  
266 Upon which the subsequent Malawian provisions are based. 
267 SI 2006/1030 Schedule 1. 
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The extent of this attenuation is unclear: Article 13(3) refers to “A claim” no longer being open to 
challenge simply because it is made by a foreign tax authority, but Article 13(1) refers to the rights 
of foreign creditors “regarding the commencement of, and participation in” the insolvency. Does 
Article 13(3) also apply to remove the revenue law rule as a bar to a foreign tax authority petitioning 
for the insolvency of a debtor, even though it does not extend textually beyond “participation”? A 
negative conclusion, it is submitted, would be overly technical, and frustrate the purpose of that 
abrogation. 
 
There seems to have been very little fanfare around Article 13(3) of the CBIR 2006 and its 
implications for the continuing relevance of the revenue law rule.268 On one level, the development 
may be unwelcome. Unlike the EIR, the removal of the revenue law rule is not premised on the notion 
of reciprocity: any and all foreign tax creditors may benefit, regardless of how their legal system 
would treat claims by HMRC.269 Nevertheless, it is submitted that Article 13(3) is a brave, if 
underappreciated, move forward, stripping back the worst excesses of the revenue law rule in a 
manner consonant with modern conceptions of comity and universalism. It is to be hoped that this 
move will encourage more jurisdictions to adopt a permissive approach to foreign tax claims in the 
insolvency context.  
 
Substantial inroads have been made into the revenue law rule within the insolvency context, which 
may strike a more fundamental blow to the modern viability of the revenue law rule. It is a cardinal 
principle of insolvency law that the onset of insolvency should not affect pre-existing rights. But, by 
dint of insolvency, a previously unenforceable claim is made enforceable, through the vehicle of 
submitting a proof in that insolvency. This may emasculate the rule against direct enforcement of 
taxes. Scots and English insolvency law both operate a test of insolvency which is premised on 
demonstrating an inability to pay debts.270 One instance is where a demanded debt of £750 has gone 
unpaid for three weeks.271 The other is to prove that the debtor is unable to pay its debts. It has been 
held that refusal to pay an undisputed debt of £1154 would be sufficient grounds to wind up an 
otherwise solvent large insurance company on this basis.272 While there may be some dispute as to 
the existence or extent of a debt under the foreign tax regime, it is unlikely that proceedings would 
--------------------------------  
268 Dicey (15th: 2012) does not even mention Article 13 in its discussion of the revenue law rule: that provision, and 
Article 53 of the EIR, only appear in the chapter on cross-border insolvency ([30-089], [30-219]). 
269 Of course, the whole of the CBIR’s implementation of the Model Law proceeds on the basis of leading by example, 
eschewing the need for reciprocity.  
270 Insolvency Act 1986 s122(1)(f) (corporate insolvency in Scotland and England); s267 (personal insolvency in 
England).  
271 Insolvency Act 1986 s123(1)(a), s267-268; Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s16(1)(i) (£1500 minimum for personal 
insolvency, but a revenue debt below this would not be worth pursuing abroad.) 
272 Cornhill Insurance Plc v Improvement Services Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 114. 
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be instituted in the UK if the foreign tax authority were not confident that such a tax debt could be 
established. 
 
The terms of the CBIR 2006 are clear: a foreign creditor cannot be discriminated against by applying 
a different test of entry into insolvency,273 and so it would be open to that foreign authority to 
commence proceedings based upon the unpaid tax debt. In practice, this may mean that Article 13(3) 
denudes the revenue law rule in the case of direct enforcement by a foreign state. Instead of suing the 
solvent debtor in the UK for the tax debt, which would fall foul of the revenue law rule, a foreign tax 
authority with a well-established claim can simply petition for the debtor’s insolvency, whereupon 
its claim will be converted into an enforceable one. While the court has discretion to refuse winding-
up, and while the tax authority’s ability to prove for the foreign tax debt is subject to both the court 
having jurisdiction over the debtor and the general public policy exclusion, it is submitted that this 
undermines any case for the continued operation of the rule. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Of private international law’s three exclusionary rules, the revenue law rule has been subject to the 
most litigation. The author shares the view of Collier that “[the] rule hardly serves the interests of 
international comity and seems to have no merit whatsoever”.274 It is of doubtful foundation, 
exorbitant scope, and the exceptions which exist render its application readily avoidable.  
 
Its foundation is doubtful as its founding authority stems from an era where the notion of co-operating 
with a foreign state to ensure the satisfaction of its taxes was an alien one. Not only has the 
relationship between states moved on from this standoffish position, but the very nature of the state 
has altered radically since then. Taxes are no longer predominantly the concern of the enterprising 
classes, but are payable by the vast majority of a state’s citizens in order to fund, among other things, 
the growing welfare state. As Castel observed:275 
 
With the tax burden becoming increasingly heavy due to the tremendous responsibilities 
incurred by modern States in all areas of human activity and in the light of prevalent 
conceptions with respect to the justice of taxation, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate all 
possibilities of tax evasion or avoidance. 
--------------------------------  
273 Article 13(1). 
274 J Collier, Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, CUP, 2001), 369. 
275 JG Castel, ‘Foreign Tax Claims and Judgments in Canadian Courts’, (1964) 42 Canadian Bar Review 277, 306.   
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Its scope is exorbitant as the expansive definition adopted of what amounts to the ‘enforcement’ of a 
foreign revenue law cannot be justified by any of the rationales commonly asserted to be the basis 
for the exclusionary rules. The lodging of a private law claim by a state cannot be said to involve 
territorial overreach into the exclusive domain of a foreign sovereign. Such a claim involves no more 
difficulty than any of the other private law claims which may be brought by a government in a foreign 
state, and denying effect to such a claim on grounds of public policy is productive of just as much – 
or as little – embarrassment as the potential operation of public policy to bar any private law claim 
brought by the state. Nor do such claims encroach into the legitimate sphere of the legislature: private 
law adjudication, even where the sum sought by way of compensation or restitution is commensurate 
with an amount of unpaid tax, is a matter within the preserve of the judiciary.  
 
Lastly, the exceptions which have been constituted to the revenue law rule make it of doubtful 
practical relevance. The fact that it does not apply where the debtor has creditors alongside the foreign 
tax authority, and that it does not apply at all in insolvency proceedings, means that the rule has no 
application in a large number of circumstances. It is therefore inaccurate to continue to refer to the 
non-enforcement of foreign taxes as a totem of private international law,276 and the approach taken 
in insolvency cases should be extended to all instances of enforcement: the foreign tax prima facie 
should be enforceable, subject only to public policy. As was put by the editor of the section on the 
validity of contracts in the 10th edition of Dicey, in a tone in direct opposition to the section on the 
exclusionary rules:277 
 
Revenue laws cannot nowadays be viewed in isolation from the remainder of the legislation 
of a country. They often serve economic as well as financial purposes. Abuses can always 
be checked by the doctrine of public policy. 
 
There are signs that this sentiment is chiming with the judiciary in some jurisdictions. In Re A’s 
Application,278 the Manx High Court of Justice held that the rule did not apply to prohibit a trustee 
from paying foreign tax liabilities of the trust. In the course of the decision, the judge made the 
following obiter comments: 
 
--------------------------------  
276 Cf P Baker, ‘The Transnational Enforcement of Tax Liabilities’, (1993) 5 British Tax Review 313, 318, suggesting 
that the rule has been stated in “terms which are too absolute….”  
277 L Collins (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), 1223-1224. 
278 [2018] WTLR 353. 
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“[the revenue law rule]… is … now being informed, if not transformed, by recent inter-
governmental moves designed to ensure international cooperation in the enforcement of 
domestic taxation in which the Isle of Man has participated…279 
 
Whether the principle still amounts to good Manx law may be for the Appeal Division and 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to determine in due course. Another rule in Dicey 
may bite the dust in due course, or at least its potential impact may be much reduced by 
legislative intervention and the increasing cooperation between civilised countries in respect 
of tax matters.”280 
 
Unfortunately, when the Privy Council considered the application of the revenue law rule 
subsequently in Webb v Webb, it did not hear any argument relating to the continuing viability of the 
revenue law rule, instead applying it without deeper reflection. It is submitted, however, that, were 
such a review to be undertaken, the days of the revenue law rule may be numbered and that, for the 
reasons presented in this paper, this would be the correct approach. 
 
--------------------------------  
279 ibid, [35] (approving of report by legal adviser). 
280 ibid 
